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Abstract 
 
The mass privatization program in Bulgaria was implemented in 1996-97.   
Following programs in countries like the Czech Republic, more sophisticated 
regulatory bodies were put into place to prevent the kind of abuses observed 
elsewhere. This study finds that Bulgaria avoided some of the extreme problems 
that manifested themselves in these other countries, but there were still serious 
problems of dilution. Dilution is similar in both mass privatization firms and non-
mass privatization firms.  Dilution is associated with positive performance, 
suggesting that more concentrated ownership has had some benefits.    Even after a 
number of years have passed, mass privatization firms have performed less well 
than firms privatized by other means.  
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Introduction: 
 
  Mass privatization programs have been carried out in many transition countries, including 
Bulgaria, Russia and the Czech Republic.   These programs had several purposes.  Given that 
these countries had very large state sectors, mass privatization provided a means for rapidly 
privatizing these sectors.   Also in countries where citizens had limited resources to buy these 
state companies, these mass privatization programs provided a means of transferring these assets 
to the population at large.  
  In Bulgaria, mass privatization occurred after attempts to use cash privatization and 
management-employee buyouts provided only limited privatization.    The first wave of the mass 
privatization program, which was the only part that resulted in significant privatization, was 
completed in June 1997.   About one-fourth of Bulgaria's state-owned enterprises (1040) were 
partially privatized through the program.   While this represented less than one-sixth of the 
estimated assets of the state enterprise sector, the mass privatization program privatized twice as 
many assets as had been previously privatized through other programs.
1 
  Several years have passed since the program was completed, so it is now possible to 
evaluate the program.   We investigate two aspects of the program:  (1)   How well have the 
firms that were privatized through the program performed since privatization?    Did they 
perform better or worse than firms that were privatized through other programs i.e. cash 
privatization, management –employee buyouts, etc.?  (2)  Did the program succeed in passing 
valuable assets to the public?   Were valuable ownership rights established for new shareholders?    
This second question is particularly important in establishing the legitimacy of the program since 
                                                 
1 See Miller and Petranov (2000) for an analysis of the early outcomes of the mass privatization program.   2
the program was sold to the public as a means of sharing the wealth that was previously under 
state control.
2    
  While there have been many criticisms of mass privatization programs in other countries, 
the Bulgaria mass privatization program had several advantages.   Because the program was 
carried out after programs had already been implemented in other countries, the Bulgarians were 
able to design their program to anticipate some features of the privatization process that had not 
been foreseen earlier.
3  For example, the Bulgarians had observed the creation of privatization 
funds (i.e. mutual funds created to participate in the voucher auctions) during the Czech 
privatization program.   The Bulgarians anticipated the participation of privatization funds and 
established regulatory institutions for licensing and monitoring these funds before the mass 
privatization program began.    They also established a Securities Commission to oversee and 
regulate the new stock markets.   Thus one might see the Bulgarian mass privatization program 
as a program that had many advantages relative to other similar programs in other countries.   
Indeed, there are some indications that Bulgarian firms which were part of the mass privatization 
program performed reasonably well during the years immediately following their privatization. 
(Atanasov, 2003) 
  Improved firm performance is, as stated above, only one criteria for judging the success 
of a mass privatization program.   A major reason that privatization programs were so politically 
difficult to implement was that they involved a transfer of wealth.  Events since the program was 
implemented in Bulgaria provide a mixed picture as to the success in transferring wealth.   Of the 
nearly one thousand firms which were initially listed on the stock exchange, only about a third 
                                                 
2 Perhaps, for some citizens, it influences their view of the legitimacy of the entire transition process 
3 In fact the program was underway when some of the worst problems of the Czech program were becoming clearer.       3
are listed today, and the shares of only a few trade actively.
4   On the other hand, privatization 
funds collected over 80% of the voucher books and acquired 87% of the shares purchased in the 
auctions.   Of the original 81 privatization funds, around 30 are still listed on the exchange and 
15 funds trade actively.  These tend to be the larger funds which initially controlled a substantial 
portion of the shares sold at auction.
5   Thus evaluating the transfer of wealth involves analysis of 
a complex web of relationships. 
  The paper is divided into two parts.   In the first part we use extensive firm level 
accounting data for the period 1996 – 2001, and for some firms through 2003, to determine the 
extent of dilution of share ownership.   Using similar investment fund (i.e. holding company) 
accounting data, we are able to determine the extent of further shareholder dilution that occurred 
through this second level of potential dilution of shareholder value.    We are able to compare the 
dilution of shareholder value in both mass privatization firms and non-mass privatization firms.   
We are also able to compare dilution levels in firms that continue to be listed on the Bulgarian 
Stock Exchange and those firms that are not listed on the exchange.   This latter category 
includes both mass privatization firms that chose to delist from the exchange and firms that did 
not participate in the mass privatization and never were listed on the exchange.  In the second 
part we investigate the performance of the firms in the mass privatization program.  First, we 
compare the performance of these firms with the performance of firms that did not participate in 
the mass privatization program.   While the mass privatization program was the first major effort 
                                                 
4 See Petranov and Miller (1999) for an analysis of the problems in the development of the stock 
exchange.  This monograph also contains an analysis of the early securities’ laws and how they 
were implemented in the early years of the stock market.  Atanassov (2005) provides an updated 
review and shows how later changes in the law were designed to prevent further dilution of the 
interests of the original voucher shareholders.  
5 The eighteen largest privatization funds controlled 60% of the vouchers in the auctions.  
   4
at privatization in Bulgaria that successfully privatized a large number of firms, many other firms 
were privatized in the following years.  (See Table 1.)   So this comparison is not a comparison 
between the performance of state firms and private firms but rather between firms that were 
privatized through mass privatization and firms that were privatized through other methods of 
which labor-management buyouts and sales to foreign companies were major methods.  While 
we were able to obtain data on the types of ownership of mass privatization firms, we do not 
have data on types of owners of non-mass privatization firms, so we are unable to compare the 
performance of, for example, mass privatization firms now owned by foreign interests and non-
mass privatization firms that are owned by foreigners.  
 
Table 1 
Source:   Agency for Privatization  (Bulgaria)  
 
  On the other hand we are able to investigate other issues.   In particular, we investigate 
whether ‘stock manipulation’ through dilution affected firm performance.    Dilution will lead to 
more concentration in the hands of those who have the power to issue additional shares at less 
than market prices. 
 
 
Percent of privatized assets in the total amount of the state-owned assets (balance values 31.12.1995)  STATE 
BODIES  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 TOTAL 
Privatizati
on 
Agency  0.32 1.47 0.50 3.53 2.38 1.76 13.99  2.32 0.60 0.99 1.36 2.58 1.51 33.31 
All State 
Bodies  0.37 1.63 1.07 4.09 3.78 4.47 16.96  4.43 0.97 1.16 1.36 2.58 1.51 44.38 
Center for 
Mass 
Privatizati
on              14.58                          14.58 
TOTAL  0.37 1.63 1.07 4.09 18.36 4.47  16.96 4.43 0.97 1.16 1.36 2.58 1.51 58.96   5
Data 
The data for both parts of the study came from four sources.   Bulbrokers, DAXY, SFB 
Capital Market JSC and the website of the Bulgarian Stock Exchange.  Along with ownership 
data for the years 1997 and 2001, we were able to obtain balance sheet and income statements on  
1033  of the 1040 firms in the mass privatization program for the years 1996 – 2001 from 
Bulbrokers.    They also provided us with accounting and balance sheet data on 4294  firms that 
did not participate in the mass privatization period for this same 1996 – 2001 period.   Because 
of missing data only 2515 could be used. 
Since we were able to obtain a nearly complete set of data for the mass privatization 
firms for this period, we were able to observe the following trends just on the basis of the data.    
First,   there are no mergers among the mass privatization firms during this period.   This was the 
result of laws that made it more advantageous for a firm to operate as a subsidiary rather than as 
a merged entity.   More liberal laws would have encouraged firms to experiment with more 
extensive reorganization.   Secondly, there were no bankruptcies among these firms during the 
1996 – 2001 period.     This is surprising since there was a severe financial crisis in 1996-97, and 
firms were selected for mass privatization before the crisis and the mass privatization auctions 
took place during the crisis.   What the data do show, however, is that there were a number of 
firms that had negative net worth.
6   While there have been bankruptcies of mass privatization 
firms more recently, these figures are an indication of the slow progress in developing effective 
bankruptcy laws in Bulgaria.    
Balance sheets and income statements for 2002-3 for mass privatization firms were 
obtained from the other sources.   Statements for listed firms were downloaded from the 
                                                 
6   The number of mass privatization firms with negative net worth from 1996 -2001 were:  29,17,32,49,69 and 94; 
respectively.    6
Bulgarian Stock Exchange website,  for unlisted firms from DAXY and SFB Capital Markets.    
This gave us an unbalanced panel with 450 mass privatization firms through 2003.     Along with 
this data we also obtained balance sheet data on 66 holding companies for 1997 – 2003.   Of 
these 57 are listed on the Bulgarian Stock Exchange.  
Dilution 
  Following mass privatization programs in several countries managers or shareowners 
with major stakes in the firms, have attempted to gain control of the firms through various 
means.    Dilution, which we calculate here as the issuing of new shares at level which dilute 
total equity per share is one means for gaining control of a firm at the expense of the original 
shareholders.  Some dilution is common in most countries.   For example, when firms issue 
options to management and managers purchase shares for less than market prices, dilution 
occurs,    There has been considerable concern about dilution in Bulgaria, however.   This is 
reflected in the passage of changes to the Bulgarian Corporation Law in 2002 that were designed 
to prevent dilution which would reduce the effective holdings of existing shareholders.
7    
  In measuring the level of dilution we employed the following formula to see whether an 
expansion of the number of shares in any given year, led to a decrease in value per share value.  
Let Sit be the number of outstanding shares at end of year t for firm i, and let Tit, be the total 
equity per share at the end of year i where total equity is adjusted for profits during the year.    If  
dit is dilution for firm i in period t,  
 we determine dit    as: : 
a) if Sit=Sit-1, dit=0; 
b) if Sit< >Sit-1, then:   7
1) if Tit > T it-1, dit=0, 
2) if Tit < Tit-1, dit =   100 *
1
it
it it
T
T T − − . 
We then find the compound impact of these annual dilutions to determine the level of dilution 
over the entire period.  
Since we did not have annual share data, we used changes in shareholder equity as a 
proxy for the number of shares outstanding since shareholder equity is book value, which rarely 
changes, times the number of shares outstanding.   Because of missing data, our sample was 
somewhat smaller than the entire sample, but the data set still contains 1011 mass privatization 
firms and 2521 non-mass privatization firms.  
  An important question in the Bulgarian context is whether firms listed on the Bulgarian 
Stock Exchange are less likely to dilute than firms not listed on the exchange.    Indeed, 
Atanasov, et. al. (2005) implicitly assumes that mass privatization firms attempt to de-list so they 
can dilute.   
  Table 2 provides information on the level of dilution for various groups.  The groups are 
mass privatization firms, non-mass privatization firms, holding companies.    
                                                                                                                                                             
7  These changes included the issuing of warrants to existing shareholders which had to be purchased  when  new 
shares are issued.   This meant that shareholders could no longer be passive observers during new share issues.   For 
a more complete description of these changes see Atanasov, et. al. (2005)).  8 
Table 2 
Firm Dilution Levels 
(Percentage of Firms in Each Decile) 
 
All MP 
Firms 
1996-2001 
Listed 
(321) 
All MP 
Firms 
1996-
2001 
Unlisted 
(690) 
450 MP 
Firms 
1996-
2001 
Listed  
(255) 
450 MP 
Firms  
1996-
2001 
Unlisted  
(195) 
450 MP 
Firms      
1996-
2003   
Listed     
(255) 
450 MP 
Firms 
Unlisted 
1996-
2003  
Unlisted  
(195) 
Holding 
Companies  
1996-2003    
Listed      
(57) 
Holding 
Companies 
Unlisted 
1996-2003  
Unlisted        
(9) 
Non-MP 
Firms 
Listed 
1996-2001   
Listed   (6) 
Non-MP 
Firms  
1996-
2001 
Unlisted    
(2515) 
No dilution  64.2  62.3  60.0  55.9  55.3  46.2  52.6  77.8  83.3  68.0 
>0%  35.8  37.7  40.0  44.1  44.7  53.8  47.4  22.2  16.7  32.0 
>10%  32.7  33.0  35.7  36.9  40.8  46.7  42.1  11.1  16.7  28.3 
>20%  31.2  28.0  33.3  30.8  38.8  40.5  31.6  11.1  16.7  25.8 
>30%  27.4  25.4  29.4  25.1  34.5  35.9  26.3  11.1  16.7  23.1 
>40%  22.7  21.3  25.5  20.5  29.8  29.2  19.3  11.1  16.7  20.4 
>50%  18.7  16.1  21.2  15.9  27.1  24.1  14.0  11.1  16.7  17.6 
>60%  15.6  11.4  18.0  11.3  22.7  19.0  7.0  11.1  0.0  14.7 
>70%  11.2  8.0  12.9  7.2  16.5  14.4  1.8  0.0  0.0  11.5 
>80%  5.9  4.2  7.1  4.1  9.4  8.7  1.8  0.0  0.0  7.8 
>90%  2.5  2.2  3.1  2.1  5.5  3.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  3.4 
                 
Average of all firms  0.19  0.17  0.25  0.25  0.21  0.18  0.17  0.066  0.09  0.17 
St Dev of all of firms  0.29  0.27  0.33  0.31  0.31  0.27  0.23  0.194  N/A  0.30 
Average of all diluting firms  0.52  0.45  0.56  0.46  0.52  0.40  0.35  0.328  0.56  0.53 
St Dev of all of diluting firms  0.26  0.27  0.28  0.29  0.28  0.27  0.22  0.407  N/A  0.30 
                 
Bold columns are firms that are listed on the BSE,  
Columns that are not bolded are firms that are not 
l i s t e d .                
Numbers in parentheses are number of firms in each group.             9 
Because we have an unbalanced panel where we have two years of additional data for the 450 
mass privatization firms, we have identified this group  separately.    For purposes of 
comparison, we show the level of dilution for these 450  firms for both 1996 -2001, so they can 
be directly compared with the other firms in the sample, and also for 1996 – 2003.   As can be 
seen by comparing the 1996-2001 column with the 1996-2003 column for  mass privatization 
firms,  dilution continued after 2001.
8   There are two columns for each group.   The first column 
in bold is for the listed companies.   The second column is for unlisted companies in each group.   
For completeness we have included unlisted holding companies and listed non-mass 
privatization firms, even though there are very few companies in these two categories.   
To provide a better sense of the distribution, the level of dilution is broken down into 
deciles.   If a firm dilutes its shares by 50%, this means that the firm has doubled the number of 
shares outstanding without increasing the total equity in the company.   A dilution level of 90% 
means that the firm has increased the number of shares by a factor of ten without increasing total 
equity. 
 The first row in the table is the percentage of firms in each category which did not dilute 
at all.   As can be seen in the table, through 2001 less than half of all firms and holding 
companies in each category diluted at all.  (By 2003, 53.8% of our subsample of unlisted mass 
privatization firms had some level of dilution.) 
 The second row in the table is the percentage of firms in each category  which had some 
level of dilution.   The third row is the percentage of firms that diluted by more than 10%; the 
fourth row is the percentage that diluted by more 20%, and so on.   While many firms had some 
                                                 
8 Atanasov, et. al. (2005)  argues that the legal changes in 2002 reduced the amount of dilution.   We can neither 
confirm or deny this since our sample does not extend far enough beyond the implementation of these changes.    10
level of dilution, only a small number of firms diluted their shares over 90%, rendering the 
original shares nearly worthless.  
If we compare the actions of mass privatization firms and non-mass privatization firms,  
using t-tests and F-tests we cannot reject the null that the means and variances of the two 
distributions are the same at the 1% level.    Thus it appears that as a whole, the two sets of firms 
have very similar dilution behavior.   
  Similar results apply if we look at the relationship between unlisted mass privatization 
firms and unlisted non-mass privatization firms i.e. we cannot reject the null that the means and 
variances of the two distributions are the same at the 1% level.
9  From Table 2 one can also see 
that a lower percentage of non- mass privatization firms diluted, but many unlisted mass 
privatization firms diluted less than 10%.   In fact when we sum the firms that did not dilute at all 
and those that diluted less than 10%, the probability of dilution is almost identical for the two 
groups of firms.  So it appears that these two groups of firms had about the level of dilution.   
If one focuses on the relationships between listed and unlisted companies in the same 
category (i.e. all mass privatization -2001, 450 mass privatization -2001,  450 mass privatization 
-2003) , it is clear that unlisted firms were more likely to dilute than listed firms.
10   Still if we 
compare the means and variances of all firms in each group (including those that did not dilute), 
using t-tests and F-tests we find that we cannot reject the null that the means and variances of the 
two distributions are the same at the 1% level (except for the means of the all mass privatization 
firms which cannot be rejected at the 5% level.)  
                                                 
9 There are too few listed non-mass privatization firms to make statistical comparisons between listed mass 
privatization and non-listed mass privatization firms.  
10 Because the number of listed non-mass privatization firms and the number of unlisted holding companies is so 
small, reasonable statistical comparisons between listed and unlisted cannot be made for these categories.     11
 In spite of this, listed firms tended to dilute more than unlisted firms.  When we look at 
firms that diluted, we find that the means of listed and unlisted firms are significantly different 
for each group at the 1% level (and different at the 5% level for the mass privatization firms -
2001).   The pattern here is illustrated in Figure 1.  The graph shows the difference in the 
percentage of firms that diluted at the different decile levels for all mass privatization firms, and 
our subgroup of 450 firms for the periods ending in both 2001 and 2003.  For all three groups, 
the percentage of firms in the listed group is larger than the unlisted group as the level of dilution 
gets beyond 40% or more. 
Since 80%  of the original mass privatization vouchers were placed with holding 
companies,  the dilution behavior of  holding companies is also important from the standpoint of 
individual investors.  If these funds also dilute their shares, then individual investors are 
subjected to a kind of ‘compound dilution” where both the individual companies and the holding 
companies  could be diluting their original ownership stake. 
The level of dilution by holding companies is also described in Table 2.   The level of 
dilution is calculated for the period through 2003.    At that point almost half of the holding 
companies had some level of dilution.   Dilution by holding companies tended to be less than 
firms, however, with many holding companies diluting their shares by less than 20%.    Among 
the larger holding companies there was also variance in the levels of dilution.   For example,  
Doverie, the largest holding, and Albena, which invested heavily in the popular Albena resort, 
did not dilute at all.   On the other hand,  Multigroup (later called Em Dzhi  Elit Holding AD) which 
had well known mafia connections,  diluted by 68%.
11 
 
                                                 
11 At the time of the auctions some people were said to have purchased Multigroup shares because they thought it 
would be good to have the mafia on their side.   They were clearly mistaken in this view!   12
Figure 1 
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Summary: 
  The evidence on dilution supports the notion that while dilution has been widespread in 
Bulgaria during the period from 1996 to 2003,  the majority of firms did not engage in any 
dilution; a few others issued so many shares that original shareholder stakes are now worthless.   
A comparison of dilution levels among various groups (mass privatization listed, mass 
privatization delisted and non-mass privatization firms) does not indicate that any of these 
groups have a significantly higher levels of dilution than the others.   This is somewhat of a 
surprise since there have been suggestions (e.g. Atanasov, et. al. (2005)) that delisting and 
dilution go hand-in-hand.   In some instances further dilution took place in the holding 
companies, but it was also more limited than might have been expected given what happened in   13
the Czech Republic after the mass privatization program there, but disappointing given the extra 
safeguards that had been put in place at the initiation of the Bulgarian mass privatization 
program.
12 
Performance: 
  Questions of relative efficiency gains from privatization have been extensively studied in 
the literature.   Djankov and Murrell (2002) provide a survey of the literature on privatization in 
transition economies.   They find that the “(e)conomic effects (of privatization) are quite often 
very large, for example adding several percentage points to enterprise growth rates. The 
privatization effect is, however, statistically insignificant in the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS).” (p. 740)  They also find that performance varies depending on the new ownership 
type, with investment funds, foreign owners and large controlling block holders producing 
significant restructuring.    
   Atanasov (2003) analyzed the situation in Bulgaria using data from 1997 -1999.     He 
compares firms controlled by the State, privatization funds, foreign owners, management and 
employees and dispersed owners.    He found that privatization funds and firms with dispersed 
ownership, which would capture many firms that participated in the mass privatization program, 
performed reasonably well.   Their performance was better than the performance of State firms 
or firms controlled by management and employees.   Over several dimensions their performance 
was comparable to firms owned by foreign owners, although they had more limited access to 
outside financial resources. 
  Our approach is somewhat different than Atanasov’s.   We focus more on the questions 
of whether the mass privatization firms performed better than the firms that were privatized (or 
not privatized) by other means.   We first compare the performance of mass privatization firms 
                                                 
12  The term ‘tunneling’ is often associated with the experience with Czech holding companies.   See      14
and non-mass privatization firms.  Then we compare the performance of mass privatization firms 
only  by ownership type.  For example, we ask whether firms where the state retained a 
significant holding perform better or worse than firms that were purchased by privatization funds 
(holding companies)?    Unfortunately we do not have ownership data on non-mass privatization 
firms so we cannot compare the performance of mass privatization firms with a particular 
ownership structure with non-mass privatization firms with a similar ownership structure.  
  We use two measures to evaluate the performance of mass privatization firms:  return-on-
assets  and sales per unit of labor cost ( sales/ wage bill).    We do not have employment data so 
we use sales per unit of labor cost as an alternative.     Table 3  summarizes the data for both 
these measures for both the entire sample of firms and the subsample that includes only the mass 
privatization firms.    It also provides data summaries for dilution the major right-hand side 
variable in our equations. 
 
Table 3 
 
Data Summaries 
 
Variable               Mean                Std.Dev.            Minimum              Maximum         No. of  Observations* 
====================================================================== 
 
Entire set of firms  
 
ROA        -0.04698     0.6702    -29.735       4.9770       13747 
SALES/WG    4049       98418.5    .00571        9600500      13204 
DILUTION    0.0315      0.1370       0          0.99448      13747 
 
 
Only  Mass Privatization Firms 
 
ROA         0.0644       0.2242     -1.4510      4.97700      5964 
SALES/WG   21.709      434.24        0.31230    21188.33      5360 
DILUTION    0.3290       0.1354          0       0.9939       5360 
 
 
Note:   The variance in the number of observations reflects missing data for 
certain variables in for different regressions.  
* These numbers reflect the number of observations in the entire unbalanced 
panel over several years.     15
Impact of Mass Privatization 
In measuring the impact of mass privatization the basic equation we use is: 
 Y it =  αi + Pi t β t +  X i  t-1 γ + D it  δ  + ε it       
where  Yit  is a measure of firm performance,  Pit  is the treatment variable equal to 1 if the firm 
was part of the mass privatization (or in later equations if the firm acquired certain ownership 
characteristics),  X i t-1  is the level of performance variable lagged one period. D it  is the level of 
other variables that might affect firm performance.  Having calculated dilution levels for each 
firm, we are also interested in determining whether dilution may affect firm performance.  β t  are 
the key parameters of the model.  They measure whether, for example, firm in the mass 
privatization program performed differently than firms that were not.   
  The State determined whether the firm was part of the mass privatization program; 
whether or not to dilute was determined by the firm.   We used the Wald test to determine 
whether dilution and the lagged value of the righthand side performance variable should be 
considered endogenous.   We reject the possibility that they are exogenous so we used two-stage 
least squares.  
  We used X i  t-2  and  X  i  t-3  to instrument the lagged dependent variable. We chose  
shareholder equity and size (based on total equity) of the company to instrument for dilution.  
Check of the Hausman test for all equations supported the use of a fixed effects model.   The 
results are presented in Table 4.  
  The results are mixed.    Being part of the mass privatization program does not have any 
significant effect on sales per unit of labor cost, but mass privatization firms did perform 
significantly less well than non-mass privatization firms with regards to return-on-assets.   What 
is most disturbing, perhaps, is that this continues into 2002 and 2003.     There was substantial   16
privatization during the period 1998 – 2000.   This privatization took the form of labor-
management employee buyouts, which were severely criticized as sweetheart deals to managers 
and politically connected individuals, and sales of large firms to foreign interests.    Thus 
comparing the performance of mass privatization firms with non – mass privatization firms in 
2002 an 2003 more or less reflects a comparison between firms privatized through mass 
privatization versus firms privatized by various other means during the preceding period.   The 
negative coefficients suggest that these other methods, granting that they reflected a variety of 
other approaches to privatization,  as a whole generated a better return for their owners. 
 
Table 4 
 
Performance of Mass Privatization Firms 
 
 
Dep. Var.          ROA                                                       SALES/WG 
                       
DILUTION      1.4932**      -1343.35     
                         (1.982)          (-0.034)    
 MP1997       -0.2241***      824.67      
                        (-9.300)           (1.033) 
 MP1998      -0.1064***      273.28      
                       (-2.064)           (0.106)    
 MP1999      -0.1348***       227.56      
                      (-3.451)             (0.123)    
 MP2000      -0.1058***       236.86      
                      (-3.167)             (0.151)    
 MP2001      -0.1146***       267.67      
                      (-2.765)            (0.129)      
 MP2002      -0.1641***       286.04      
                     (-4.832)           (0.111)    
 MP2003      -0.2014***      251.22      
                     (-5.139)       (0.134)      
 
      F  =        1.17      2.25 
 
Adj R2 =    0.045|      .28379 
 
t- statistics in parentheses,  *** significant at 1% level,  ** significant at 5% level,  *significant 
at the 10% level   17
  We also tested in both equations whether dilution had an impact on performance.  Again 
the results were mixed: insignificant in the sales per unit of wage cost equation and significantly 
positive in the return-on-assets equation.    The positive coefficient in the return-on-asset 
equation may suggest that the greater concentrated ownership resulting from dilution may have 
had a positive effect on performance.    
Impact of Ownership  
  Since we have ownership data for mass privatization firms, we were also able to ask the 
question whether ownership made a difference within the group of firms that were part of the 
mass privatization program.   Our procedures for determining the impact of ownership are 
similar to those above.   We investigated whether different levels of dilution had an impact 
across the firms and using dummy variables for the various ownership types, we asked whether 
concentration of different forms of ownership had an impact on performance.    We looked at six 
categories of ownership:  state ownership,  foreign ownership,  ownership by privatization funds,  
ownership by a private individual (or perhaps another firm), ownership by labor-managers and 
dispersed ownership.  Where possible we looked at two ownership levels:  34% and 50%.   In the 
case of foreign ownership and labor-managed ownership there were so few firms in the 34 – 49% 
range, we combined these categories into one 34% and above category.   
  While 50% signals full majority control,   34% was also chosen because, under the 
commercial code, significant decisions require a two-thirds majority.  So a 34% ownership level 
represents a ownership holding large enough to block major decisions.   Under special legal 
provisions, the State can exercise control if it holds at least 34%.   During the mass privatization 
program the State retained this level of control over many of the large firms that participated in 
the mass privatization program.   (Miller and Petranov, 2000)    18
    Table 5 presents our results for the evaluation of the ownership impact on 
performance.  
 
Table 5 
 
Ownership Effects 
 
Dep. Var.                ROA      SALES/WG 
 
 DILUTION     0.6249        -337.11                
             (1.043)         (-.197)    
 STATE50      0.1158***     -4.43           
             (5.024)       (-.075)        
 STATE34      0.0429**      0.2032           
             (2.024)        (0.006)    
 PRIV50       0.0421**      5.18            
             (2.506)       (0.151)    
 PRIV34       0.0217        5.60            
             (1.132)        (0.147)    
 FOREIGN      0.0528*       16.62                  
             (1.935)       (0.204)       
 LAB-MANG    0.0814**       -0.6958           
             (2.517)        (-.014)    
 INV FUND50   0.0512**        7.67         
             (2.196)        (0.185    
 INV FUND34   0.0403***     0.5714           
             (2.888)         (0.029)    
 DISP50      -0.0307        -70.96**        
             (-1.356)        (-2.004)    
 DISP34      -0.0033       -4.38           
             (-0.115)        (-0.078)    
 
 
     F=        .92      3.84 
 
Adj R2 = - 0.01775      0.35059 
 
t- statistics in parentheses,  *** significant at 1% level,  ** significant at 5% level,  *significant 
at the 10% level 
 
The results for the sales per unit of labor cost measure are largely insignificant.   Only 
firms which have highly dispersed ownership show any difference from undefined ownership.   
High levels of dispersed ownership perform more poorly.   This is not a surprise.   Before the 
mass privatization program went forward, there were concerns that if ownership were too 
dispersed,  managers would not be properly supervised by owners.   As it has turned out,   19
however, this group (over 50% dispersed ownership), makes up only 5% of the total sample.   A 
major reason for this is that privatization funds (now investment fund holding companies)  were 
such large players in the original auctions.  For example,   investment funds hold 34% or more of 
the shares in 14% of the firms in the sample. 
  The impact of ownership on return-on-assets is larger and more differentiated.   Firms 
that are controlled by investment fund holding companies perform significantly.  better than the 
undefined ownership group.   State firms, labor-managed, foreign firms and firms held by private 
individuals (when the stake is over 50%)  also perform significantly better than the undefined 
group.   Firms with high levels of State ownership tend to be large firms.  The State was hesitant 
to relinquish control over these so it is not a surprise that they perform well.    Foreigners were 
not permitted to bid directly in the auctions but gained control of  firms by buying shares directly 
from privatization funds (investment funds) who acted as their agent in the auctions.  (Miller and 
Petranov, 2000)  Foreign firms that were interested in investing in Bulgaria also had other 
options later as the State sold many of larger firms in cash sales in the years following the mass 
privatization auctions.   
  As in the earlier equations where we tested the impact of dilution over the entire set of 
firms, we tested for the impact of dilution here as well.  It is not a significant factor effect 
performance in either equation.  Here we are also including concentration of ownership of 
various types so the insignificant coefficient on the dilution variable may be caused by the fact 
that we are picking up concentration of ownership through the other variables in the equations. . 
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Conclusion 
  The mass privatization program in Bulgaria was implemented during the crisis years of 
1996-97.    Occurring later than the mass privatization programs in countries like the Czech 
Republic,  more sophisticated regulatory bodies were put into place to prevent the kind of abuses 
that had been observed in these earlier programs.   
  With these better institutional arrangements Bulgaria was able to avoid some of the 
extreme problems that manifested themselves in these other countries.   Still there were serious 
problems of dilution, and later revisions to the law were passed to try to cope with these abuses.    
Interestingly, the problem of dilution is similar in mass privatization firms and non-mass 
privatization firms so the problem of dilution is not simply a function of the mass privatization 
program.  
  When viewed from the perspective of performance, dilution does appear to have had an 
impact on performance, suggesting that the more concentrated ownership associated with 
dilution has had some positive benefits, even though it has also had an important downside, 
shifting wealth away from the original owners into the hands of a few.  
  To the extent that the mass privatization program was an attempt to distribute wealth to 
the general population, it was only partially successful.  Many firms did not dilute, but a small 
percentage of firms diluted shares dramatically.     
  Our analysis compared the performance of mass privatization firms to those firms that 
were not privatized through the mass privatization program.   Here the results are mixed.   There 
appears to be no difference with respect to sales per unit of labor costs, but the performance of 
mass privatization firms with respect to return-on–assets is significantly worse than non-mass   21
privatization firms.    Even after a number of years have passed, mass privatization firms have 
performed less well than firms privatized by other means.  
  Comparing firms within the mass privatization program by ownership type, we found that 
firms with higher levels of ownership concentration, regardless of type of ownership (state, 
foreign, investment funds, labor –managed) performed better than firms with dispersed 
ownership; thus,  confirming one of the chief concerns of those who criticized mass privatization 
as a method that dispersed ownership would lead to poor performance.   Fortunately in Bulgaria, 
where a large share of vouchers were collected by privatization (later investment holding 
companies) concentration of ownership became common place among mass privatization 
companies.     22
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